



BILLS TO QUIET POSSESSION AND TITLE.
THAT the judgment of a court having competent jurisdiction is,
while unreversed, conclusive upon parties and privies, and estops
them from litigating a fact once passed upon, is a maxim of both
the civil and the common law. The maxim equally applied to
actions respecting the title to real estate and to those respecting
personal property. When, however, the action of ejectment was
substituted for real actions, it was found that, owing to an ingeni-
ous legal fiction, a recovery in ejectment constituted no bar to a
second, or to any number of similar actions for the same premises.
By the fiction of a lease, entry and ouster, and the recovery of a
fictitious term of years, the same issue could be tried between the
same parties, as the record would exhibit an entirely different issue
and between different parties. In this way it was possible for a
party in possession with both a legal and equitable title to be
annoyed by continued litigation, which sometimes resulted in ruin.
In order to suppress this vexatious and oppressive litigation, courts
of equity finally interposed, and allowed what is known as a "bill
of peace" to be filed, which sought to procure a repose from any
farther litigation of the title to the property.
But to justify any interference upon the part of equity, the
courts insisted that it should appear that the title was vexatiously
litigated. And Lord CowPER, in a celebrated case, refused to inter-
fere where five several verdicts and judgments in ejectment had
been rendered in favor of one party. Lord Bath v. Sherwin, 10
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Mod. 1. But the House of Lords overruled this decision, ana
established the jurisdiction: 4 Brown's Oases in Parliament 373.
"It has not been usual," says one of our federal judges, "to
exhibit a bill in chancery for quieting title between two individual
claimants until after several verdicts at law. But it seems not to
have been held that any precise number of verdicts at law was
necessary before a bill of peace could be sustained. The better
rule would seem to be, that the title at law has been fully and fairly
established by one or more trials." ifarmer v. Gwnne, 5 McLean
815. See also 2 Term Rep. 601.
In order to maintain a bill of peace, it was necessary that three
circumstances concur:
1. It was necessary that the plaintiff or complainant should be
in possession of the premises at the time of filing the bill.
2. It was necessary that his possession should have been disturbed
by legal actions.
3. It was necessary, finally, that his right to the possession
should have been successfully maintained in the litigation, and his
title satisfactorily established at law.
In the absence of any of these three circumstances, equity
refused to interfere. Shepley v. _Rangely, Davies Rep. 242, 249.
It was not enough that he feared his possession would be disturbed,
or that some one was actually claiming an adverse interest in the
property. " When the question is merely whether A. or B. is
entitled to the property, and there has been no actual suit-between
them, there has been no instance where such a suit has been enter-
tained." So says Lord REDESDALE in -Devonsher v. Newenham,
2 Sch. & Lefroy 208. See, also, Welby v. Duke of .Rutland,
2 Bro. Parl. Oases 39; Shepley v. 1Rangely, Davies Rep. 242,
250. It was the fact that the right to possession had already been
litigated and successfully established at law that furnished the
equity or the ground upon which such bills were originally enter-
tained. In course of time, however, it came to be noticed that
great injury might be wrought, not only to individuals, but to the
public as well, by the assertion of an interest in or claim to real
property by persons who were not only out of possession, but who
refused to put their claim to the test of a legal trial. The asser-
tion of such claims tended to throw doubt upon the validity of
titles, thus rendering them insecure, impairing their value, and
rendering it difficult and sometimes impossible to effect a sale of
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the property. Such a condition of things was a public misfortune.
"There are few greater public misfortunes," it has been said,
"than insecurity of titles to real property. It paralyzes industry
and destroys that incentive to labor and enterprise which a reason-
able certainty of just reward alone will create, and upon which
depends the public and private prosperity: McCoy v. Morrow, 18
Ill. 519. Consequently, we find that in many of the states laws
have been enacted to compel the determination of claims to real
estate, and to quiet the title to the same. These statutes have
been enacted to enable persons who are in possession of real estate
to compel parties who claim an interest in such estate to submit
their claim to the adjudication of a competent tribunal, which
should examine into the foundations of the claim, and forever settle
all controversy as to the same. Bills filed for such a purpose are
filed for the purpose of quieting the title, as distinguished from the
old bills of peace which were filed to quiet the possession after the
right to the possession had previously been determined in an action
at law.
These statutes differ in the different states. In Massachusetts
the law is that any one who is in possession of real property claim-
ing an estate therein, may file a petition against an adverse claim-
ant who is not in possession, praying that he may be summoned to
show cause why he should not bring an action to try the alleged
title. Upon notice being given, the court is authorized to hear
the parties, and to make such a decree respecting the bringing and
prosecuting of such action as seems equitable and just. This
statute has been strictly construed: so strictly that a person is not
allowed to file his petition as above provided for, if he has any
other remedy of which he can avail himself, notwithstanding the
language of the act is broad enough to allow any one who is in
possession to file a petition for such purpose. And the court so
limits the right that no one can file the petition unless he is in
possession of the premises, and receiving profits therefrom. For
it is held that unless he is receiving profits, he can, without pre-
judice, consider himself as disseised by the claimant, surrender
his possession, and bring a writ of entry, which will determine his
rights: Olouston v. Shearer, 99 Mass. 212; Munroe v. Ward, 4
Allen 150. So where one filed his petition under the statute,
alleging that he was in possession, and praying that the respondent
might be summoned to" show cause why she should not be required
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to bring an action to test the title, and it appeared that the peti-
tioner had title to the premises as the assignee of an insolvent
debtor, under a regular assignment, and that the respondent held
a mortgage deed, made to her by the insolvent as security before
the insolvency, and under which she was claiming title, the court
dismissed the petition upon the ground that the petitioner could
bring an action himself to try his title, counting on his own seisin,
and electing to consider the respondent's claim as a disseisin:
Hill v. Andrews, 12 Cush. 185.
Under the Missouri statute, where one who is in "possession"
can file his petition, as in Massachusetts, and compel the claimant
to show cause why he should not bring an action to test his title,
the court requires complainant to be in the actual, as distinguished
from the constructive possession, of the premises. The reason for
this being found in the fact that constructive possession is a ques-
tion of law, and depends upon validity of title. To assume that
complainant is in constructive possession of the property is to
assume that he has the valid title to the premises, which is the
precise question to be determined: Iron Phul v. Penn, 31 Mo.
334; .Rutherford v. Uliman, 42 Id. 216, 218.
In Tennessee it was deemed wise to provide that a party in pos-
session could bring an action of ejectment against any one out of
possession claiming legal title to the property: Smith v. Lee, 1
Coldw. 549; Langford v. Love, 3 Sneed 308. This enables the
validity of the claim to be settled, and quiets the title but not the
possession. The language of most of the statutes authorizing per-
sons to file bills to quiet their title is that any person "in posses-
sion" is entitled to do so. In the construction of these statutes
a question has been raised as to what must be the nature and
character of this "possession" to justify a court of equity in
assuming jurisdiction of the bill. Such a question arose in Com-
stock v. Henneberrl, 66 Ill. 212, the facts of the case being as
follows: The defendant had recovered possession of the premises
in dispute in an action of forcible entry and detainer, and had been
put into possession by the sheriff. Subsequently the complainant,
or those representing him, broke into the house and retook posses-
sion, during the absence of the defendant, and refused to surrender
it, claiming the legal title to the property. The complainant then
filed his bill to quiet his title, claiming to be in "possession" of
the premises. The court dismissed his bill, and said: "Is the
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appellee to be considered as in possession when he commenced his
suit? He was in the actual possession, but he obtained it unlaw-
fully and forcibly. He cannot take advantage of his own wrongful
and illegal acts as the foundation for equitable jurisdiction and
relief. The appellee is to be treated as out of possession for all
the purposes of this suit, so far as jurisdiction is concerned." This
was followed by Hardin v. Jones, 86 Ill. 316, which reasserted the
same doctrine. " But that possession that gives jurisdiction in
such cases must be such as was acquired in a lawful way, for it
cannot be that equity will lend its aid to protect a possession
wrested from another by violence, or obtained by the use of any
unfair or corrupt means." Possession in this case had been
obtained by corrupting the tenant of the defendant, and complain-
ant's bill was therefore dismissed. Similar doctrine has also been
asserted in Oregon, and the court there reiterates the doctrine that
a wrongful possession cannot be made available as a ground upon
which a standing in a court of equity can be obtained. " If an
unlawful possession be used to give a party a standing in a court
of equity to quiet a title, then a person who is a tenant of another
can enter under his landlord, and then set up an equity in himself
and dispute his landlord's title and abrogate the well-established
rule that a tenant cannot dispute his landlord's title. So also if
such a rule prevails, one who claims an equity in land can dispos-
sess the owner of the legal title by force, and then take advantage
of his tortious entry to try his equity and make his forcible entry
and possession lawful. Such a construction would encourage
entries on land by force and breakers of the peace in possession:
Ticlhenor v. Knapp, 6 Oregon 205. It must be confessed that the
reasons assigned for giving this construction of these statutes are
forcible. It is a fundamental principle of equity jurisdiction that
he who comes into equity should come with clean hands, and it has
passed into a maxim that no one shall be allowed in equity to take
advantage of his own wrong. It is not unreasonable, therefore,
to doubt the intention of the legislature to pass an act which dis-
regards these ancient and wise principles, and it seems that courts
are warranted in assuming that the legislature had no such inten-
tion, unless that intention has been unmistakably expressed. In
Nevada, however, a different view has been taken of this subject,
and we find that court interpreting the statute literally, saying:
"The mode of acquiring possession is of no consequence. The
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statute gives the right of action to any person in possession, irre-
spective of the mode by which possession has been acquired. We
are not authorized to create exceptions, or impose limitations which
the statute does not- recognise, and can perceive no good end to be
subserved by doing so even if we had the power: Scorpion S. H.
Co. v. Marsano, 10 Nevada 378. In California, too, we find the
Supreme Court of the state announcing that it does not matter
how possession is acquired: Reed v. Calderwood, 32 Cal. 109.
We should think it proper, nevertheless, to construe the statute
equitably, especially as courts are not confined in the construction
of statutes to the exact language used. "The letter is sometimes
restrained, sometimes enlarged, and sometimes the construction is
contrary to the letter: (4 Bacon's Abr., tit. Statute, 1, sects. 38,
45, 5 a). In New Jersey, the statute on this subject differs from
those in the other states in that it requires the complainant to
be in "peaceable possession." This may be construed to mean
simply a possession which was not obtained by force and has not
been retained by it. This is perhaps the most natural, and, there-
fore, the most reasonable construction which can be placed upon
the words, although we have heard it urged that whatever would
be a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment would render the
possession unpeaceable within the meaning of the statute. In
Powell v. Mayo, 9 C. E. Green 178, 181, the New Jersey court,
in passing upon the statute, said: "It requires possession merely ;
the only qualification being that it shall be peaceable as contra-
distinguished from disputed or contested possession, and that it
shall be under claim of ownership. Quiet occupation under claim
of title gives the complainant standing in court under the act."
And attention is called to the fact that the complainant had not
heard of any adverse claim being made to the property until four
years after conveyance of the property to him. This possibly
implies that his possession would not be regarded as peaceable
within the meaning of the statute, had he knowingly purchased
a litigious title.
In Kansas, the statute requires that complainant should be "in
possession by himself or tenant." And here we find the court
holding that a constructive possession is not sufficient. We think
no.other conclusion could be reached, owing to the peculiar phrase-
ology of the act, and the court well says that "constructively, the
owner of land is as much in possession when it is occupied by his
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tenant as when by himself, and if the possession mentioned in the
section was a mere constructive one, then the words 'or tenant'
have no significance; but by giving to the word possession its
primary legal meaning of an actual possession, the words 'or
tenant' become of importance by extending the right to claim the
interposition of the court one stop beyond actual possession to that
of the tenant of the person :" Baton v. Giles, 5 Kans. 28 ; O'Brien
Creitz, 10 Id. 203.
In Ohio, where the statute required complainant to have "the
legal title and possession," the court held that the possession must
be actual, such construction being unavoidable in order to give
effect to the word possession: Hubbard v. Clark, 8 Ohio 384.
It being conceded that the circumstances attending the posses-
sion of the complainant are sufficient to authorize the court in
assuming jurisdiction of the bill, the question next presented con-
cerns the nature of the claim which is being asserted to the preju-
dice of the complainant. Is the remedy confined to those cases in
which the adverse claimant sets up a legal or an equitable title ?
It has been held not to be so confined, but "to embrace every de-
scription of claim whereby the plaintiff might be deprived of the
property, or its title clouded, or its value depreciated, or whereby
the plaintiff might be incommoded or damnified by the assertion of
an outstanding title already held, or to grow out of the adverse
pretension. The plaintiff has the right to be quieted in his title
whenever any claim is made to real estate of which he is in posses-
sion, the effect of which claim might be litigation or a loss to him
of the property :" Joyce v. McAvoy, 31 Cal. 274. At one time it
was held in Ohio that in order to confer jurisdiction, it was essen-
tial that the claim made by defendant should be adverse to the
complainant's right to the present possession of the property.
But in lBhea v. Dick, 34 Ohio St. 422, that doctrine has been
overruled.
The next important inquiry which confronts us in the investiga-
tion of this subject, is that which relates to the character of the
defendants. Who may be made defendants in such a suit? The
statutes say "any person or persons" asserting a claim to the land.
If the literal construction given to the words "any person in pos-
session" by the courts in California and Nevada (already noticed
as allowing any person in possession to maintain the suit without
reference to the means by which possession was acquired), was
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justified, then the same principle of literal construction would seem
to compel us to refrain from placing any limitation upon the
number of defendants to such a suit. But such a proposition is so
manifestly absurd that we doubt the ability of any one to gain
credence for it anywhere. We are not surprised to find the
Supreme Court of Michigan repudiating such a doctrine, and
declaring that any bill filed to quiet title is subject to the objection
of being multifarious, if it makes persons defendants whose claims
to the land in dispute are in no way connected: Hunton v. Platt,
11 Mich. 264; Hall v. Kellogg, 16 Id. 138.
This brings us to the inquiry, what title must the complainant
show himself to be possessed of in order to obtain the relief sought.
In most of the states, the statutes throw no light upon this question.
In a few states, however, it is expressly required that the complain-
ant should have the legal title to the premises. Where the statute
is silent as to complainant's title, and merely requires him to be in
possession, is naked possession sufficient to enable him to maintain
his bill and obtain relief? In Stark v. Staars, 6 Wallace 410, the
Supreme Court of the United States expressed itself as follows:
"We do not, however, understand that the mere naked possession
of the plaintiff is sufficient to authorize him to institute the suit,
and require an exhibition of the estate of the adverse claimant,
though the language of the statute is that any person in possession
by himself or his tenant, may maintain the suit. His possession
must be accompanied with a claim of right, that is, must be founded
upon title, legal or equitable, and such claim or title must be
exhibited by the proofs and perhaps in the pleadings also, before
the adverse claimant can be required to produce the evidence upon
which he rests his claim of an adverse estate or interest."
Conceding that possession must be accompanied by a claim of
right, the question arises as to the character of the legal or equit-
able title upon which the claim is founded. Must complainant's title
be a paramount one? We think that it is unquestionable that it
need not be, and we base the opinion both upon principle and the
weight of authority. In fact, so far as we have been able to dis-
cover, after a pretty careful examination, we believe that no case
has ever been decided under these statutes which declares that
complainant must have paramount title. In Michigan it is said
that it is not essential that he should show a title which would be
perfect against all the world; if apparently good against the
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defendant, that will be sufficient: Bayner v. lee, 20 Mich. 388;
Hall v. Kellogg, 16 Id. 138. In Kansas it is said that it is no
defence for defendant to show paramount title in some one else:
Brenner v. Bigelow, 8 Kans. 501. In another case, in the same
court, it is said that "a party in the quiet, peaceable and rightful
possession of real estate, claiming title thereto, although his title
may be ever so defective, may quiet his title against any adverse
claimant whose title is weaker than his, or who has no title at all."
Giltenan v. Lemert, 13 Kans. 481. In Nevada, the rule is "that
the burden is upon the defendant, if he admits plaintiff's possession
or does not disclaim, to plead and prove a good title in himself,"
Sdorpion S. 1ff. Co. v. Alarsano, 10 Nevada 379. And in Illinois
the court say: " We do not understand that a plaintiff in a suit to
quiet title is bound to show a perfect title as against all the world,
as in the case of a party seeking to recover possession:" Bucker v.
Dvoley, 49 Ill. 384.
Any other rule would work great injustice. If A. is in the
possession of land having a superior title to that possessed by B.,
what justification is there for B.'s proclaiming his title better than
A.'s to the prejudice of the latter, and how can it help B. that C.
may have a title superior to either? If B. had possession of the
land he would be entitled to hold it against all but the true owner,
and in such case C.'s paramount title would avail him as against A.
But no reason is perceived why it should avail him in the assertion
of a false claim to land which is in A.'s possession, and in the
assertion of which B. can derive no advantage, while A. may
suffer much harm. If C. permits A. to remain in possession, it
surely is none of B.'s business, and cannot inure in any way to his
advantage, while it may result finally, if long enough continued,
in transferring the paramount title from C. to A. Finally A.'s
title is good against all the world but C., and no one but C. or his
representatives can object to it.
The general rule is that one out of possession cannot maintain
a bill for the purpose of quieting title: Stout v. Cook, 41 Ill. 448.
And yet in Shays v. Norton, 48 Id. 105, it is said that equity will
entertain a bill to quiet title where complainant holding the legal
title is out of possession, provided defendant is in possession claim
ing equitable title. In Michigan, the right of the legislature to
authorize one out of possession to file his bill to quiet title is
denied. "It is not in the power of the legislature under our pre-
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